Tobias Schumacher*
Professor at NTNU
Just two days after the International Day of Democracy was celebrated by an alarmingly decreasing number of democracies around the globe, many in Brussels and other European capitals held their breath and Argus-eyed Ursula von der Leyen’s presentation of the new European Commission and its designated 26 Commissioners.
As the culmination point of months of intense strategising and a good amount of horse-trading, fuss and fudge with the 26 Member States’ governments, the public presentation of the new college on 17 September 2024 was much awaited both by stakeholders inside the EU and, most certainly, in the EU’s neighbourhood, not least given the multiple challenges EUrope and its current peripheries are faced with.
Considering von der Leyen’s first tenure as Commission-President, during which she was repeatedly accused of concentrating power in her hands, sidelining EU decision-makers, and interpreting her mandate in the widest of ways, it did not come as a surprise that she was criticised almost instantly after she had revealed the persons and the design of each portfolio.
Much of the critique focused on the fact that she did not – even minutes before her actual press conference – brief the President of the European Parliament and the heads of its political groups, that she pushed out critical voices from her past college, and that she bestowed important portfolios on politicians with ties to far-right parties, corporate interest groups, and big businesses.
This critique was accompanied by concerns over the structure of the new Commission and the nomination of numerous individuals largely unknown to the wider European public, cementing the widespread impression that the Commission-President’s primary rationale was to preside over (weakened) Commissioners who would not (dare to) challenge her, therefore, amassing even more power and influence than between 2019-2024.
Some of these accounts must obviously be taken with caution. In particular, the notion that the nomination of Commissioners is in von der Leyen’s discretion is misleading. Like any Commission-President, she is bound to work with the candidates suggested by EU Member States’ capitals, and even though von der Leyen persuaded some governments to nominate different individuals, this is the exception rather than the rule.
Regardless of this caveat, it is interesting to note, though, that rather little attention was paid to how the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as well as “neighbourhood” – as a concept and in political terms – are about to feature in the new Commission. Ever since the adoption of the Wider Europe communication of 11 March 2003, the positioning of the ENP and the neighbourhood in the European Commission’s institutional structure and policies, but also within the EU’s multi-level system of governance more generally, has been systematically upgraded, and “neighbourhood” as such has even featured in the Commission’s intricate and complex Directorates-General architecture for an impressive twenty years.
This is bound to change unless the European Parliament will reject the entire Commission, force von der Leyen’s hand, and push for a major overhaul of the Commission’s structure later in the year. According to von der Leyen’s plans, there will not be a Commissioner for Neigbourhood and Enlargement anymore, but also the ENP itself as a policy framework, hitherto uniting under its roof both Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus on the one hand and, on the other, (parts of) the Middle East and North Africa, seems to have become a relic of the past. Instead, von der Leyen’s new organigram foresees one Commissioner for Enlargement and one Commissioner for the Mediterranean.
Clearly, this is a construction that was predominantly motivated by the fact that what used to be the “southern neighbourhood” is nowadays mainly and rather misleadingly perceived through the exclusive lens of migration whilst “eastern neighbourhood” has become a residual category, apparent in the designation of the new “DG Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood”, that is destined to capture first and foremost the accession ambitions of war-torn Ukraine, Moldova and possibly Georgia.
Quite regardless of the important narrational shift this new division implies, how the Commission is set to view the space beyond the EU’s borders throughout the next years, and the fact that neither portfolio has been given to a political heavyweight with much-needed political gravitas and relevant expertise, what is even more eye-catching are the many omissions in the mission letter by von der Leyen given to the Commissioner-designate for Enlargement, the Slovenian Marta Kos.
Apart from the more general sections that are identical in all mission letters, the concrete mission statement for Kos is conspicuously short and vague, lacking vision and ambition. Remarkably, it does not contain any single direct reference to democracy and does not consider it to be important to spell out as an objective the need to continuously help Eastern European societies – regardless of whether they are on an EU membership track or not – in their struggle for democratic rule and the respect of civil political rights and liberties.
Surely, von der Leyen’s letter refers to the EU’s merit-based approach and stresses the need for Kos to put “particular emphasis on the rule of law and fundamental values”. However, and apart from the fact that this seems to imply a rather minimalist understanding of democracy, the Commission-President’s expectation is put in direct relation to the EU’s enlargement policy only, rather than address all six Eastern European countries.
Continued support of Ukraine and its reconstruction are singled out as priorities, and so is the implementation of the Association Agreement with Ukraine, as well as Moldova and Georgia. Likewise, one sentence is devoted to the countries of the Southern Caucasus, in the context of which von der Leyen expects Kos to “develop a coordinated approach […] including on regional connectivity”. Belarus, though, is not mentioned at all, even though it is a direct neighbour that is likely to pose an increasing security threat to the EU as it continues to be sucked up by Russia.
This is clearly insufficient and problematic. At a time when the Georgian Dream-led government is doing everything in its power to torpedo Georgia’s democratic progress and push through legislation that is incompatible with EU values and norms, and while the regimes of Lukashenka in Belarus and Aliyev in Azerbaijan are consolidating their dictatorial rule, incarcerating literally any dissident voice, remaining silent plays into the hands of autocrats. In addition, it undermines further the already much debated credibility of the EU as a democracy support actor and norms entrepreneur, in turn impacting how the EU is being perceived by civil societies which are confronted either with a shrinking civic space or even full-blown oppression in many parts of the region.
Putting in place a new European Commission is a tremendous opportunity that sends out important signals to stakeholders inside and outside the EU, and it has the potential to reinvigorate and/or revise policy debates and policies. But, as far as the Commission’s future role vis-à-vis Eastern Europe and societies’ fight for democracy and political participation is concerned, this opportunity has been missed.
Surely, much can still happen between now and the European Parliament’s hearings and eventual approval/rejection of the Commission and individual Commissioners-designate, especially in light of the multiple conflict dynamics in Eastern Europe. For the many reformists and actors committed to democracy and the rule of law, however, living in a region that is exposed to multiple threats, including, of course, Russian aggression, time is precious and cannot be wasted.
Thus, matching to a larger extent external needs and hopes across all of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus with intra-EU – or rather intra-Commission – power-related dynamics and constraints would have been highly desirable, if not to say crucial in the run up to Ursula von der Leyen’s press conference on 17 September 2024.
The blog was initially published on REDEMOS.
* Tobias Schumacher is Professor of European Studies at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) in Trondheim and Senior Professorial Fellow at the College of Europe (Natolin campus), Warsaw. He is the Deputy Coordinator of REDEMOS and a Co-Work Package Leader in REUNIR.
Photo credits: “MEPs call for action on energy prices, enlarge Schengen to Romania and Bulgaria” by European Parliament is licensed under CC BY 2.0.
