This report was commissioned by Charge Research Platform Volt and was originally published by CEPS (Centre for European Policy Studies).
Executive summary
As Russia’s war continues to rage in Ukraine and NATO’s philosophy of deterrence has been eroded by the caprice of the Trump administration, Europe is ramping up its defence spending. By working through the EU institutions, member states aim to harmonise standards in the dual-use sphere, stimulate joint production, and facilitate joint procurement. But can this be done quickly enough to deter Russia from openly attacking EU territory? Does the EU need new institutions to turbocharge defence procurement and catalyse the de-fragmentation and upscaling of its defence industry?
This study argues that in order to raise European strategic autonomy and effectively deter malevolent great powers EU member states will ultimately have to solve the following trilemma: accept a substantial impact on other policy areas or tax hikes; cede the exercise of sovereignty over parts of their national militaries; or compromise on what weapons systems to buy and from whom. Accumulating national defence expenditures does not automatically contribute to a common defence for Europe. Still, if ‘only’ EUR 150bn of the envisaged EUR 800bn were pooled to stimulate joint production and facilitate joint procurement, then that would be a game-changer at EU level.
In their White Paper on European Defence Readiness 2030, the Commission and High Representative lay out a roadmap for defence industrial integration. But they have shied away from issues of organisation, personnel, training, leadership and education, which are key to exercise due diligence in determining the feasibility, suitability, and acceptability of a military design change. This omission can be explained by the fact that forward defence in Ukraine, which is a precondition for the EU’s own security, is hampered by disagreement between member states about sending lethal aid and deploying a peacekeeping operation. While the White Paper promotes an “open architecture combined with variable geometry” to enhance the EU’s security, it is driven by its own logic. Yet, the search for a coalition of the able and willing currently happens outside the EU’s structures so as to include NATO allies like the UK and Turkey. The EU may thus have to adapt to organisational realities that serve the wider European security order. Such a new fixture may well outlive the EU’s defence industrial roadmap for 2030, a timeframe which is too short to add territorial defence to the Union’s mandate and reform the EU institutional setup through treaty change—and constitutional amendment at the level of the member states. This report was commissioned by Charge Research Platform Volt and produced by the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS). Principal author: • Steven Blockmans (Associate Senior Fellow at CEPS and Senior Fellow at the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) in Tallinn). Contributions to specific sections were provided by: • Karsten Meijer (Lecturer and PhD Researcher at the Faculty of Law, University of Amsterdam) for sections 2.2 and 2.3 • Judith Arnal (Board Member of the Bank of Spain and Associate Senior Research Fellow at CEPS) for section 3.3. This report as commissioned by Charge Research Platform Volt was coordinated by Marike Blanken (project manager) with support from Berrie van der Molen. We would like to thank Peter Knoope for his advice and support throughout the process. The content and recommendations of this report are the responsibility of the authors. Reuse, reproduction and distribution are authorised provided the source is acknowledged. © 2025 Charge Research Platform Volt. This publication is licensed under the Creative Common license CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. See: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.nl Charge is an independent research platform associated with Volt Netherlands. Charge focuses on two research themes: democratic renewal and European integration. More information: https://www.charge-volt.org/ 4 5
This study charts a path towards a governance system for the EU’s common defence beyond 2030. To that end, this report compares eight models which are the product of different strategic visions (supranationalist, intergovernmental, hybrid) and examines the organisational, legal, and financial feasibility of four pre-selected arrangements and their compatibility with NATO. On this basis, the study projects a roadmap of European defence integration between now and 2035. The roadmap is based on what experts who were consulted for this report considered to be both effective and achievable arrangements to join up EU defence industrial integration and cooperation on military operations.
No single model is both operationally/legally/financially feasible and sufficiently robust to deter an armed aggression by hostile great powers, which according to some military intelligence services could happen in the next two to five years. In the short term a creative reinterpretation of existing mandates and the coherent implementation of a set of complementary solutions, all under apt democratic oversight, will therefore have to suffice to protect EU territory and citizens. Various models of EU defence governance can be upgraded in parallel. In the defence industrial sphere, this can be done by using the Commission’s new powers foreseen under the European Defence Industrial Programme, which can act as a catalyst for the supranationalisation of military capability planning hitherto entrusted to the European Defence Agency. In the operational sphere, the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex) could be upgraded with military-grade equipment to defend the outer borders of the Union. To that end, the role and functioning of Frontex should be thoroughly reviewed to put meaningful accountability mechanisms in place. For expeditionary deployment, pioneering groups of member states could use PESCO to permanently structure enhanced forms of military intelligence sharing and equip more sizeable force packages grafted onto the new Rapid Deployment Capacity. The command structures over the standing ‘EU marine corps’ and the pioneering expeditionary forces should be integrated in an upgraded military headquarters that joins up with minilateral command structures which currently exist outside of the EU.
On the basis of a geopolitical assessment and a review of the capabilities needed to attain strategic autonomy from the United States, this report argues that in the longer term any serious move towards a credible and legitimate common defence will require that member states transfer the exercise of sovereignty over parts of their national militaries and endow the EU with an operational mandate to defend European territory and citizens. This should involve the integration of arrangements previously developed outside the EU framework. Forging a common defence will require EU treaty change, institutional reform, constitutional amendment at the level of the member states, and thus time to prepare and execute.
