Author: Erekle Gozalishvili is Communications Officer for the REUNIR Horizon Europe project and holds a Master’s degree in European Studies from the University of Regensburg.
Introduction
Since the early 1990s Georgia has formally chosen European integration as its foreign policy priority. With commitments embedded in the European Union (EU) – Georgia Association Agreement, enshrined in the Constitution of Georgia, and consistent reflection of public opinion support towards EU integration, it has become a strategic priority for the country. Although the EU granted Georgia candidate status in 2023 the pro-European trajectory has been disrupted by Georgian Dream (GD) government’s decision to abort the EU accession process in November 2024. This move has been accompanied with a gradual consolidation of authoritarianism with Russian-style political practices, including the consolidation of power, weakening democratic institutions, selective justice, and the adoption of repressive laws. These are developments that directly impact Georgia’s domestic political environment, foreign policy orientation, and EU integration prospects.
The following trends are also increasingly reflected in public opinion polls, which show rising public skepticism about the feasibility of successful EU accession. Recent polling data confirms this shift: while roughly 74% of society state that they would vote for EU membership if a referendum were held, a growing share of respondents doubt that Georgia is politically ready for membership or that the government is willing or able to implement the required reforms. In addition, polling data indicates a significant decline in public trust in the EU within Georgian society, decreasing from 66% in Spring 2024 to 49% in Spring 2025. This suggests that, although pro-EU sentiment remains high, public support for European integration is becoming more conditional and increasingly vulnerable to political manipulation and information influence.
Despite formal orientation, recent years have also witnessed a noticeable shift in government rhetoric toward the EU. The ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party and its senior leadership increasingly deploy language that portrays the EU not as a strategic partner, but as a source of instability, moral threat, or political coercion.
This reframing coincides with targeted Russian anti-EU disinformation campaigns conducted by Kremlin-linked state and non-state actors, aimed at eroding trust in Western institutions and creating political ambiguity in neighbouring countries such as Georgia. In the Georgian context, these narratives do not always appear as explicit foreign propaganda. Instead, they are often domesticated and legitimised by local political elites, pro-government media and affiliated civil society actors, whose strategic or ideological interests converge with the Kremlin’s preferred geopolitical framing.
The implications of this trend extend beyond Georgia. For the European Union, Georgia’s rapid democratic backsliding and discursive shift could represent a strategic loss of credibility in its enlargement and neighbourhood policy. This weakens the EU’s normative influence in the South Caucasus and creates space for rival authoritarian actors such as Russia, China and Iran. For Georgia, the costs include losing the window of opportunity for EU membership, democratic erosion, international isolation, stalled reforms, economic vulnerability and the risk of long-term geopolitical marginalisation.
Given these escalating political and strategic costs, this paper examines the core Russian-origin anti-EU narratives evident in Georgian political discourse. It identifies the actors by whom these narratives are transmitted and analyses the mechanisms through which they are effectively circulated and normalised in the Georgian context. The analysis highlights the extent to which information influence has become a decisive factor in Georgia’s gradual drift toward strategic ambiguity.
