Summary
Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine has dramatically changed the security landscape in Europe. It not only unexpectedly resulted in three new Candidate Countries from the Eastern Neighbourhood but also shifted EU enlargement policies from a technical process to a geopolitical project. While EU enlargement policy has already been ‘geopoliticised’ in Brussels, it still lacks implications on the ground that would reflect a new paradigm where Candidate Countries are no longer wait-listed recipients of EU assistance but fellow architects of a common resilience infrastructure. In order to effectively tackle external threats, local vulnerabilities in Candidate Countries, as well as administrative shortcomings, need to be addressed from the EU side. Thus, the EU should:
- adjust its programmes in the Candidate Countries to the new reality by making their development, implementation, and assessment more inclusive (CSOs, SMEs, local public authorities), tailor-made, and aimed at long-term impact;
- involve Candidate Countries that align with the EU CFSP in EU military initiatives and cooperation, particularly in the new technologies and defence industry, civil-military cooperation, and cybersecurity;
- establish socio-economic programmes addressing the structural vulnerabilities of local economies through supporting high–value-added production, fostering EU-originated investments, regional development, and creating educational and job opportunities for youth;
- ensure equitable distribution of resources throughout the diverse regions of the Candidate Countries, by making sure to support projects outside urban centres and in the peripheries;
- through strict conditionality, facilitate tangible changes in the judiciary systems while simultaneously developing the capacity of state institutions and political parties;
- co-design communication strategies with local actors in order to create better awareness of EU investments and aid in a way that makes sense to the local population.
