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Perks and Perils of Geostrategic In-Betweenness: Theoretical and Empirical Insights from within the EU-Russia (Un)Common Neighbourhood – European Security

Perks and Perils of Geostrategic In-Betweenness: Theoretical and Empirical Insights from within the EU-Russia (Un)Common Neighbourhood – European Security

Tyushka, A., & German, T. (eds.). (2025). Perks and Perils of Geostrategic In-Betweenness: Theoretical and Empirical Insights from within the EU-Russia (Un)Common Neighbourhood. European Security, 34(4) Special Issue (9 articles), 519-702.

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Individual Articles:

Perks and perils of “geostrategic inbetweenness”: the EU–Russia great power competition in the “(un)common neighbourhood” and foreign policy choices of states caught in-between

Author: Andriy Tyushka

Abstract

Conventional wisdom has it that the “in-between” countries, especially those located between the rivalling great(er) powers, find themselves “between a rock and a hard place”, which neatly reflects the precariousness of such a geopolitical positioning, fraught with replete nasty consequences for bespoke countries’ security, sovereignty and foreign policy considerations. Russia’s three wars – against Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014, and especially the ongoing full-scale invasion since 24 February 2022) – perhaps most vividly, albeit tragically, demonstrate the perilousness of geopolitical “inbetweenness”. However, with “inbetweenness”, it is not only that the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. Unlike much of the research on small and weak states, liminality and margins in international relations, the study of geostrategic “inbetweenness” looks into reverse possibilities and triadic geopolitical dynamics, exploring how “in-between” states can and do defy and/or deploy their challenging geopolitical positioning against all odds. This article disentangles the sources and manifestations of geostrategic “inbetweenness” across the EU-Russia contiguous neighbours, as well as it systematises in-between states’ both uniquely available and generally applicable foreign and security policy repertoires within three key strategic choices (consent, contestation or counteraction), thereby providing empirical insights from across Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus.

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Geostrategic “inbetweenness” as a (mis)fortune of Eastern European neighbours of Russia and the European Union

Authors: Andriy Tyushka & Tracey German

Abstract

Research on the nature, ways and effects of EU-Russia competition in their “common neighbourhood” has proliferated over the past two decades, although little attention has been paid so far to analysing the implications of such a geopolitical struggle for those states caught “in-between” the two power poles. This Special Issue seeks to address the current gap in the literature, with a particular focus on how the lasting sense of geostrategic “inbetweenness” has shaped the strategic and security cultures, as well as foreign policy choices, of those states located “in-between” the EU and Russia (the EU’s six Eastern Partnership countries, which at the same time form part of Russia’s “post-Soviet space”). It seeks to advance theoretical and conceptual debate on geostrategic “inbetweenness” as well as make an original empirical contribution to a better understanding of what underwrites “in-between” states’ choices in terms of their foreign and security policy models, and the drivers of continuity and change, against a backdrop of dynamic strategic interactions between the EU and Russia.

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Eastern Europe post-February 2022 – embracing geostrategic “in-betweenness” or bracing against it?

Authors: Tracey German & Andriy Tyushka

Abstract

The SI has sought to cast an “inside-out” perspective on the much-studied competition between the EU and Russia over their shared neighbourhood in the Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus (EE&SC) region, examining the impact of this rivalry on the states caught “in-between” the two competing actors. The articles within the SI have focused on the agency of the “in-between” states and examined the choices they have in terms of their foreign and security policies within the context of their triangular strategic interaction between the EU and Russia, and their ongoing competition for power and influence. It examined the “in-between” states’ own perspectives and (geo)politics that seek to defy and/or deploy their peculiar geostrategic positioning – and it will do so through the involvement of the authors from within the region.

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In-between who? Armenian and Georgian shifting perceptions and geostrategies of inbetweenness amidst EU–Russian power projections

Authors: Kornely Kakachia & Bidzina Lebanidze

Abstract

This article examines how Armenia and Georgia, two small states navigating the contested geopolitics of the South Caucasus, are devising distinct geostrategies in response to their condition of “in-betweenness”. Situated between the European Union’s soft power appeal and Russia’s hard power assertiveness, both nations face acute security dilemmas that have intensified since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. We analyse the strategic calculations shaping their foreign policies, focusing on how elites in Yerevan and Tbilisi perceive and leverage the asymmetric power projections of the EU and Russia. Our findings reveal that despite their different alliance histories, both states have adopted nuanced hedging strategies. Armenia, disillusioned by its traditional security guarantor, is pursuing a strategy of cautious security diversification, while Georgia’s ruling elite has adopted a policy of pragmatic accommodation with Russia to mitigate key source of military threat and also ensure regime survival, even as it maintains a formal EU accession track. By centring the agency of Armenia and Georgia, we demonstrate that their policies are not passive reactions but calculated strategies designed to maximise autonomy and security in a region where the EU’s civilian power model proves insufficient to alter the fundamental logic of hard power politics.

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Photo credits: Taylor & Francis