Steven Blockmans
Senior Research Fellow, CEPS
For decades, Europe has anchored its foreign policy and international outlook in the principles of multilateralism, cooperation, and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act reinforced these principles and laid the groundwork for the post-Cold War European security architecture, embodied in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), NATO and the EU. Fifty years on, this model is under severe strain. The rise of great power competition, driven by the resurgence of geopolitical blocs, is pushing the world towards a Yalta-style order, named after the conference held on the Crimean peninsula exactly 80 years ago. This shift presents clear and present dangers for the EU and its like-minded neighbours, in particular EU candidate countries, forcing the continent to reassess its strategic position in a world increasingly defined by confrontation rather than cooperation.
The decline of the Helsinki order
The Helsinki model was predicated on the idea that international relations could be managed through dialogue, diplomacy, and legal agreements. European nations largely embraced this system, believing that economic interdependence, rule-based governance, and institutional cooperation would guarantee long-term peace. The EU, in particular, built its identity around these principles, assuming that economic integration would eventually erode historical rivalries.
However, the 21st century has witnessed a gradual erosion of this order. The 2008 financial and refugee crises, Brexit, and internal divisions within the EU have weakened European cohesion. External shocks, in particular Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale war of conquest of Ukraine since 2022, have precipitated this demise. China’s growing global assertiveness and the United States’ shifting foreign policy priorities under President Trump are the last nails in the coffin of the Helsinki order. Rather than adhering to cooperative principles, today’s great powers are increasingly resorting to diplomatic coercion, economic pressure, and military interventions to secure their interests.
The return of Yalta
The Yalta model, which emerged from the 1945 conference that divided post-war Europe into spheres of influence, represents a fundamentally different approach to global governance. It assumes that the world is best managed by a few dominant powers who carve up geopolitical space according to their own interests, rather than by universal principles of international law. In today’s context, this is reflected in the growing tensions between the US, China, and Russia, with smaller states and middle powers being forced to choose sides or navigate between these competing blocs.
For Europe, this transition is deeply unsettling. The EU, designed as a post-national entity, is inherently uncomfortable with Realpolitik. Its reliance on soft power and economic influence is ill-suited to a world where military strength and strategic leverage are once again paramount. EU member states’ traditional security guarantor, the United States, is undergoing a dramatic strategic recalibration, with the second Trump administration doubling down on its strategic rivalry with China, ready to conclude a dirty peace deal with Putin’s Russia over the war in Ukraine, and forcing allies, partners and other states alike into a highly transactional mode of bilateral relations. This raises the uncomfortable conclusion that Europe cannot continue to depend on the transatlantic alliance as it has in the past.
Europe’s strategic dilemma: between dependence and autonomy
As the world drifts towards a Yalta-style order, Europe faces a stark choice: does it reinforce its alignment with the US-led West, or does it carve out a more autonomous geopolitical role? Each option carries significant risks and implications.
Strengthening ties with the US remains the most straightforward option for many European states. NATO’s central role in European security remains indispensable, and the threats posed by Putin’s Russia have underscored the necessity of American military and economic support. However, closer alignment with Washington comes at a cost. European strategic priorities do not always align with those of the US, particularly when it comes to relations with China, where many EU member states have significant economic stakes. A stronger transatlantic bond may also limit Europe’s ability to act independently in crises where American interests diverge from European concerns.
French President Emmanuel Macron has championed the idea of “strategic autonomy,” arguing that Europe must develop its own defence capabilities and reduce its military reliance on the US. The rest of the EU has come around to accepting that they need to make significant investments in military capabilities, greater policy cohesion among member states, and a fundamental shift in mindset regarding the use of power. While appealing in theory, this path is fraught with challenges. Many member states have long underfunded their defence sectors, and political divisions within the EU make it difficult to form a coherent and unified foreign policy. Additionally, creating a viable European security structure outside of NATO remains an uphill battle.
A third way?
A third approach is for the EU plus its like-minded neighbours to position as a balancing force, maintaining engagement with the US while also fostering pragmatic relations with China and even Russia, where possible, after a sustainable peace deal has been reached to end the war in Ukraine. This would allow Europe to act as a stabilising power in global affairs, leveraging its economic and diplomatic clout to mediate between rival powers.
However, this approach is risky. Both Washington and Beijing already view European hedging with suspicion, and any attempt to move between them could lead to a loss of trust on both sides. The EU, if it is to become a relevant geopolitical player, must undergo profound reforms. It needs a stronger defence industrial base, a credible military deterrent and expeditionary force, a more coherent foreign policy, and a willingness to act decisively when its interests are at stake. The recent discussions to boost defence spending and bolster military cooperation are steps in the right direction, but they remain insufficient in a world where military deterrence is making a comeback and internal political divisions continue to debilitate common action. Pending more fundamental reforms to the EU’s architecture and decision-making, coalitions of the willing may be the best way forward. Such looser frameworks have the advantage of onboarding like-minded neighbours across institutional divides, but they should be consistent with the rules agreed to by member states in the context of the EU. As such, the commitments made by pioneering groups outside the EU framework could ultimately be morphed into the structures of the European Union.
In sum
The shift from a Helsinki world to a Yalta world represents one of the greatest strategic challenges Europe has faced in decades. The continent can no longer afford to assume that economic interdependence and diplomatic engagement alone will guarantee its security. Instead, it must adapt to a world where great power competition is the dominant force, requiring a mix of military readiness, strategic cohesion, and diplomatic agility. How the EU, its candidate countries, and other like-minded neighbours navigate this strategic transition will define Europe’s role in the world beyond the next few turbulent years.
Photo © Wikimedia Commons
