Author: Tõnis Idarand, former fellow at ICDS and Representative of Estonia to the EU’s Political and Security Committee
On November 19th 2024 President Vladimir Putin signed an Executive Order on “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence”, which formally approved the changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine. The new doctrine is a slightly modified version of the first public nuclear doctrine of four years earlier. This development got some attention from those who had been following Moscow’s nuclear sabre rattling since the beginning of its invasion of Ukraine and had noticed some changes in Russian official rhetoric on nuclear doctrine updates from June 2024.
Since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 Russia has tried to deter the West from supplying weapons to Kyiv by using different ways of nuclear signalling – veiled or explicit nuclear threats, exercises of strategic forces, weapon tests or deployment of non-strategic nuclear capabilities on the territory of Belarus. To maintain credibility and efficiency of such coercion, Moscow had to invent new ways of deterrence messaging. When some Western capitals expressed concerns about the validity of the nuclear doctrine of the Russian Federation in autumn 2022, Moscow understood which button to push to keep the nuclear escalation fears alive. Russian false accusations of Ukraine preparing to use a dirty bomb or working on the development of biological weapons were interpreted by the West that Russia was searching for a pretext for nuclear use to end the conventional conflict in Ukraine. This might have been supported by the idea of so-called ‘escalate to de-escalate’ strategy attributed to Russian military thinking, which foresees the limited use of nuclear weapons to terminate a conventional conflict on acceptable conditions for Russia. In response to Western anxiety about Russia’s nuclear doctrine, Moscow at official level confirmed regularly that the nuclear policy document is valid and in no need of any changes.
The problem was that Moscow’s aggressive nuclear signalling during the invasion was not supported by the Russian nuclear doctrine from 2020, which was quite benign, had a high threshold of nuclear use, and defined nuclear weapons ‘exclusively’ as a means of deterrence. This gave reason in Western capitals to interpret this doctrine as being reserved for the use of nuclear weapons in cases when Russia is attacked. The doctrine did not indicate any contingency where Russia’s aggression against its non-nuclear neighbour would be shielded with nuclear threats.
Old wine in new skins
Discussions about introducing changes into nuclear doctrine have taken place in Moscow since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Lowering the threshold on nuclear use and introducing the possibility of a preventive nuclear strike have been proposed by some hawkish Russian experts and public officials. Knowing well that nuclear doctrine is just a declaratory part of nuclear policy, an instrument of communication, Russia’s leadership kept rejecting these calls. Yet, the perceived need to upgrade deterrence signalling in anticipation of new developments in Western support to Ukraine in 2024 led the Kremlin to announce plans to update the doctrine. The process itself was as used as an instrument of nuclear signalling. As the West was discussing the removal of caveats on long-range missiles provided to Kyiv, the decision to change the doctrine was made public simultaneously with a non-strategic nuclear forces exercise in June of 2024. The revised document was signed on November 19 – on the same day that Ukraine fired ATACMs, ballistic missiles at military facilities on Russian territory and two days before the combat test launch of a new nuclear capable IRBM Oreshnik.
Nuclear doctrines usually address the following questions: when and against what targets could these weapons be employed, and what is the policy towards non-nuclear states? In debates on Russian nuclear policy the issue whether and when Moscow could decide to use nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict is usually raised, as Russian military thinking attaches an important role to nuclear weapons, especially in a potential conflict with NATO. The previous version of the nuclear doctrine document reserved the possibility to use nuclear weapons in conventional conflict “when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy”. The wording of this condition is ambiguous and leaves much room for interpretation. The new version of the document mentions “aggression with conventional weapons creating a critical threat to Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” (emphasis added). As this fuzzy contingency evidently does not amount to an existential threat to Russia, it looks as if the threshold for nuclear use has thereby been lowered.
The new doctrine widens the range of circumstances in which nuclear use could be considered. Receipt of reliable information on a massive launch of air or space attack with strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned and hypersonic aerial vehicles. Therefore, a conventional aerial attack in local or regional conflict, such as a Ukrainian attack with UAVs and cruise missiles on targets in Russian territory, could give reason to consider a nuclear response. Moscow has already been sending such signals by attacking Ukraine with missiles like Iskander, Kalibr, Kihzhal, which all are nuclear capable. Combat testing of Oreshnik, an intermediate range ballistic missile, capable of carrying multiple nuclear warheads, was first of all a signal to the West in response to allowing Ukraine to target their missiles into Russia. It could also have been intended as a relevant warning after the agreement between previous US Administration and Germany from July 2024 to deploy intermediate range ballistic and cruise missiles in Europe.
The new version of the doctrine specifies the targets of nuclear deterrence and possible nuclear use but is also more specific on potential adversaries – states and alliances considering the Russian Federation as a potential enemy, and states with nuclear weapons or significant conventional forces. But also states that provide their territory, sea or air space and resources for committing aggression against Russia. An aggression against Russia by a non-nuclear state with the support of a nuclear state is considered as their joint attack.
The document also extends the list of military risks and threats which will be neutralised by nuclear deterrence – like the establishment and expansion of military coalitions (cf. NATO or possible post-NATO arrangements) leading to advancement of military infrastructure close to Russian borders. Also, adversarial actions aimed at isolating Russian territory – a clear reference to Russian concerns over its Kaliningrad enclave or blocking access to vital transport communications (cf. the Baltic Sea, which could be easily closed for Russian navigation). Conducting a large-scale military exercise near the borders of Russia by a potential adversary is another new element on the list of dangerous activities to be addressed by nuclear deterrence.
However impressive this list, the new doctrine does not constitute a major change of the previous one. The changes to the doctrine and the way they were presented have been tailored to respond to developments in the war in Ukraine in 2024. All the publicity around the nuclear doctrine, including President Putin presenting the changes during a publicly broadcasted meeting of the Security Council, served the purpose of nuclear signalling. The new doctrine should be seen as intended to deter the new quality in western support to Kyiv, but also pointing to some new red-lines for the future. Despite extending the list of threats addressed by nuclear deterrence and broadening the circumstances of nuclear use, the new doctrine does not fundamentally alter the psychology and limits the possibility of nuclear weapons to cases of aggression against Russia.
Russia’s renewed nuclear doctrine is no game changer as its nuclear posture, recent developments of new delivery systems for non-strategic nuclear weapons, and nuclear signalling covering its aggression in Ukraine are not in line with this public nuclear doctrine. These actions rather support Putin’s warning at the Saint Petersburg Economic Forum that Europe is defenceless against Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons and that the USA will hardly be interested in participating in European conflict at the strategic weapons level. Today there may be some reason for concern in light of the US’s plans in connection with European security, including the deployment of US intermediate range conventional missiles in Germany in 2026 as agreed under the Biden administration, or relating to Moscow’s demands laid down in its December 2021 draft agreements with NATO and the US on security guarantees.
The doctrine gives the right to decide the use of nuclear weapons to the President. It is very unlikely that in real-life decision making the President will look at the declaratory part of nuclear policy, which public nuclear doctrine usually is. Public and unclassified nuclear policy documents serve to communicate priorities, send public nuclear messages and outline some red lines in order to deter threats or actions of a potential adversary. Intentional ambiguity of these documents leaving room for interpretation are expected to enhance the deterrent effect of nuclear doctrine. Russia has used the talk about nuclear doctrine, its validity or need to introduce changes and eventual renewal of it as an instrument from nuclear signalling toolbox to deter Western military support to Kyiv. The new US Administration is expected to publish its own nuclear policy document – Nuclear Posture Review. In the past, such reviews have presented continuity with the previous doctrine. However, considering the recent pronouncements by the Trump administration on European security, Ukraine and nuclear weapons, the question is whether there will be some respective changes in the next nuclear policy document of the United States.
Photo©️ Alexander Nemenov/AFP/Getty Images/CNN
