Author: Kristina Nikolic, External Research Associate of the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)
The large-scale migration of Russian nationals has been a notable consequence of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This exodus was triggered by the swift suppression of anti-war protests, mass arrests of opposition activists, and the introduction of repressive laws that criminalised criticism of the Russian military and prohibited labelling the invasion as a “war.” The migration intensified further on September 21, 2022, when President Vladimir Putin announced a partial military mobilisation, prompting hundreds of thousands to flee.
Among the many destinations, Serbia emerged as one of the most attractive European options for Russian expatriates. The 2009 bilateral agreement on mutual travel established a visa-free regime, allowing Russians to stay in Serbia for up to 30 days per visit with unlimited entries. Unlike most European nations, Serbia did not impose sanctions on Russia and kept its airspace open, maintaining direct flights to multiple Russian cities. These conditions have contributed to the rapid growth of a Russian immigrant community, concentrated primarily in Belgrade (83.4%) and Novi Sad (12.7%).
According to official data from the Serbian Border Police Administration, obtained at the two requests for access to information of public importance made by the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) and received on August 5, 2024, and February 12, 2025, a total of 73,197 applications for temporary residence permits in Serbia were submitted by Russian immigrants between February 24, 2022, and December 31, 2024. Of these, 67,236 permits were approved, reflecting an approval rate of over 90%.
The number of applications has steadily increased each year, with 20,270 filed in 2022, 24,704 in 2023, and 28,223 in 2024.
The temporary residence permit applications do not account for Russians using the visa-free regime between Russia and Serbia to conduct so-called visa runs, where they exit and re-enter Serbia every 30 days. Many still rely on this method, as it is quick and easy, with Bosnia and Herzegovina also visa-free and just a two-hour drive from Belgrade and Novi Sad.
However, all foreigners, including Russian individuals, must complete residence registration at a local police station within 24 hours of arrival. According to the Serbian Border Police Administration, there were 948,934 such registrations by Russian citizens from February 24, 2022, to December 31, 2024, peaking in 2024. This number, however, reflects repeat entries rather than the total number of Russian arrivals since the invasion.
Although precise data on the number of Russian citizens currently residing in Serbia is unavailable, estimates based on the provided data above suggest a population of approximately 80,000 to 110,000.
The increased visibility of Russians in Serbian public life—in streets, public transport, cafes, restaurants, and the business sector—has sparked questions about their long-term plans, integration, and potential impact on Serbian society and politics. These issues were explored in a recent study conducted by BCSP, which combined survey data and in-depth interviews with a representative sample of Russian nationals who relocated to Serbia after February 24, 2022.
Arrival and Adaptation to Serbian Life
The research shows that the majority of Russian immigrants in Serbia are young (ages 24–39, 55.6%), highly educated (66.4%), and predominantly self-employed (42.4%). This suggests that they represent a valuable, skilled labour force that could benefit the Serbian economy.
Additionally, 96.5% of respondents feel safe in Serbia, and 93.8% have either applied for or plan to apply for a temporary residence permit.
For most Russian expatriates in Serbia, returning home is not a viable option. Their primary motivations for leaving Russia were: security concerns (57.5%) and political reasons (47.7%). Since arriving in Serbia, 64.4% have not returned to Russia, with 50.3% citing security concerns as the main reason. Looking to the future, only 13.5% of respondents would consider going back—and even then, only under specific conditions: an end to the war in Ukraine (56.9%) and a regime change in Russia (38.5%).
These findings suggest that the majority of Russians in Serbia view their relocation as permanent or long-term, with only 9% ruling out the possibility of eventually applying for Serbian citizenship.
Political Views: A Community of Resistance, Not Kremlin Propaganda
Despite concerns that the Russian expatriate community could act as a conduit for Kremlin propaganda or destabilise the region, the research strongly refutes this notion. Instead, the findings indicate that Russians in Serbia hold predominantly liberal, pro-democratic, and anti-war views. 51.9% believe Russia is on the wrong political course. 58.1% disapprove of the actions of the Russian military in Ukraine. Only 15.9% support Vladimir Putin.
This presents a sharp contrast to political sentiment inside Russia. A June 2024 Levada Centre poll found that 87% of Russians in Russia still approve of Putin’s leadership, while 74% believe the country is on the right path.
However, the research also uncovered a clear link between support for Putin and a positive perception of Serbia’s regime. Among those who approve of Putin, 55.9% also view Serbia’s political situation favourably. By contrast, among those who oppose Putin, only 35.8% have a positive view of Serbia’s politics, while 29.9% view it negatively.
Fear and Silence: The Challenges of Political Expression
A notable trend in both the survey and interviews is the widespread reluctance among respondents to discuss sensitive political topics. 32.8% were hesitant to answer questions about Ukraine, whereas 39.4% avoided responding to questions about Putin.
This silence is likely driven by fear: many Russian expatriates worry about potential prosecution by Russian authorities or even extradition from Serbia. As one respondent explained: “There have been stories of people who participated in protests and were later deported. So far, I do not want to risk it.” Similar cases of deportations of Russian anti-war activists have been already recorded in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, but also Serbia where some of them were labelled as a “security risk” and ordered to leave or banned to enter the country.
In that regard, based on data that the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy received on the two above mentioned requests to the Serbian Border Police Administration, on August 5, 2024, and February 12, 2025, the number of rejected temporary residence applications by Russian citizens in Serbia saw a significant increase in 2024, with 1,465 denials compared to 245 in 2023 and 309 in 2022. This trend suggests a possible tightening of criteria for temporary residence approval in the country.
While 60.9% of respondents believe Russia should pursue democratic reforms, political participation remains minimal: 72.8% have not engaged in political or civic activities since relocating.
Many Russians in Serbia cite a lack of understanding of Serbian politics as a reason for their passive stance. However, interviews also suggest that many prefer to stay silent about Russia’s current regime, prioritising personal safety and economic stability over activism.
Conclusion: A Community Focused on Stability, Not Revolution
The Russian expatriate community in Serbia is shaped by a desire for safety and economic well-being. Predominantly well-educated and self-employed, they hold pro-democratic values but remain cautious in their political engagement.
For most, returning to Russia is not an option unless significant political changes occur or the war in Ukraine ends. Instead, many are settling into life in Serbia, viewing their adaptation as successful and planning for long-term residence.
Far from being agents of Russian influence, this community sees Serbia as a place of refuge rather than a platform for political activism. Their focus is on securing economic stability and rebuilding their lives, rather than engaging in political struggles—either in Serbia or back home.
The full publication from which this blogpost is distilled was originally published in Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) and co-authored by Srdjan Cvijic and Kristina Nikolic. This publication was made possible with the support from the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI).
Photo ©️ AP Photo/Marko Drobnjakovic
