Author: Salome Kandelaki, Policy Analyst, Georgian Institute of Politics (GIP)
Freedom of expression and information is essential for Georgia as an EU membership candidate state in line with the Article 11 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and as one of the key preconditions for the EU enlargement process. Media polarization mirrors political fragmentation in Georgia. Due to their dependence on partizan support and funding, most mainstream media sources echo the parties’ political agendas. Consequently, media partisanship has gradually become a normalized phenomenon. However, thanks to diversified international donor funding, with the EU alone – supporting civil society including media with 22.5 million between 2015-2023, several online media agencies have managed to exercise a higher degree of independent and objective reporting. They thus represent a middling space between sharply polarized, partisan media outlets. Although free and objective media still exists (so far, at least), it does not translate into a high rate of public consumption or public trust towards them. Since 49% of the Georgian population relies on TV channels as their primary source of information, EU support for opposition media is essential—not only to protect their rights but also to ensure their continued existence.
So far, none of the types of media organizations have been able to avoid the repressive hand of the authoritarian regime of the Georgian Dream. Almost all media agencies have become victims of either political repression, or capture.
Victim I is a non-partisan media funded by foreign donors. This category includes media outlets such as Netgazeti-Batumelebi, Publika, Civil Georgia, OC-Media, Mautskebeli, and others). Notably, among the main sources of information for the Georgian people, the second place goes to online press, including social media, with 40%. When it comes to reputation ranking of the online media, Western-funded organizations, such as Civil Georgia, and Netgazeti-Batumelebi, are among the top 10. Such media agencies are the most successful in maintaining neutrality and independence, which is what makes them the main targets of the GD regime. A clear example of how the government has attacked this type of media was the “Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence”, also referred to as the “Foreign Agents Law”, as well as the recently initiated word-by-word translated American FARA, which adjusted version might replace the already adopted aforementioned law. On top of it, the GD has also initiated the amendment to the Law on Broadcasting for media censorship aiming at restricting media outlets from receiving funding from foreign sources. On March 5, 2025, both laws were passed in their first reading. They represent a major attack on neutral media. The first law forces foreign-funded media to register as “foreign agents”, which would undermine freedom of speech – not least because most of them refuse to register as “agents”. The second law practically eliminates foreign-funded critical media agencies. It is worth noting that the EU has already allocated €8.5 million for civil society and media and is set to provide an additional €7 million to counter disinformation spread by Georgian Dream (GD). However, given the existing restrictions on accessing these funds, one might question whether providing financial support at all remains effective.
Victim II are the opposition media agencies, such as Mtavari Arkhi (with 8% of public trust), TV Pirveli (6%), and Formula TV (2%), which are partly affiliated with political parties of the opposition, even though they maintain a degree of editorial independence. Of the three most-watched opposition TV channels, the Mtavari Arkhi has been suspended from broadcasting since February 15, 2025, due to a financial dispute raised by one of the channel’s co-founders, which was assessed as serving the interests of the GD. As for TV Pirveli, its owner’s case was in court for years on highly questionable charges. Apart from this, TV Pirveli was fined along with Formula TV several times. Since 2019, starting with the far-right aggressive group’s attack on TV Pirveli’s operator, which eventually resulted in his death, journalists have been attacked, injured, fined, or arrested in the course of their duties while covering rallies, both by informal groups and law enforcement officers. As for Formula TV, one of the owners was the Minister of Defense of the previous UNM government, so it has been easy for the GD to stigmatize and demonize this channel. Recently, Guram Rogava of Formula TV was severely beaten by law enforcement officers. Overall, there were almost 298 cases of harassment and violence against the media in 2024 alone.
Victim III could be the pro-governmental media organizations, like Imedi TV (with 22% of public trust), Rustavi 2 (8%), Post TV (1%) and the Georgian Public Broadcaster (2%). One might ask why they should be classified as victims at all, considering the privileges and high funding that they enjoy? To that end, we should remember that Imedi TV was captured in retaliation and revenge for the illegal actions of the previous UNM government that seized Imedi TV by force. In response, upon coming to power, the GD seized the channel “peacefully” in the name of “restoring justice.” Rustavi 2, which was the main satellite channel of the former UNM government, was also seized by GD under the pretense that it was being returned to the real owners. As for Post TV, this is a propaganda outlet that was created by the government itself as a propaganda tool that justifies any actions of the GD. Accordingly, journalists working in these television outlets, especially Imedi and Post TV, are victims in the sense that they cannot actually conduct free journalistic activities. As for the Public Broadcaster, although it is funded by the taxpayer from the state budget, it is not sufficiently balanced as requested by law. This has gradually begun to be protested from within and as a result one of the journalists has been suspended from the news program. Meanwhile, daily public protests have taken place for the past three months regarding the channel’s policies outside the headquarters demanding people’s voices be heard via allegedly public-owned TV. Accordingly, this channel too is itself a victim since the government has taken it hostage.
If independent media ceases to exist, freedom of speech will inevitably vanish. The ability to report on victims of repression and expose government misconduct will be lost, paving the way for authoritarianism—an outcome that neither the Georgian people nor the international community can afford to accept. Now is the crucial moment for the EU to develop alternative strategies for securing funding channels in support of media freedom in Georgia. The EU funding models applied in Belarus, Russia and Hungary in support of oppressed media could potentially be used in case of Georgia too. In particular, funding independent media operating from abroad, distributing micro-grants through third parties and crowdfunding might help the survival of the Georgian critical media under the emerging authoritarian rule.
Photo©️ IPN
