Authors: Prof. Kornely Kakachia, Marek Kohv, Dr. Bidzina Lebanidze
Georgia, a small frontline state in the Black Sea region, has been caught between Russian and Western interests since the 1990s. The ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict has intensified Georgia’s vulnerability to information threats and malign influence. A recent policy paper originally published by the Georgian Institute of Politics examines how these threats impact Georgian society’s psychological resilience and what role different actors play in either exacerbating or mitigating these vulnerabilities.
Understanding the Threat Landscape
Psychological resilience, in this context, refers to the capacity of individuals and societal groups to recover from or resist misfortune. It involves not just “bouncing back” to normalcy but also “bouncing forward” through adaptation. However, a key finding of the policy paper is that Georgia’s low degree of psychological resilience undermines its ability to respond to information threats. This is partly due to a significant gap in perceptions regarding the country’s key objectives and risks among different segments of society and the political class.
Relying on NATO’s new conceptual framework, the paper defines information threats as “intentional, harmful, manipulative, and coordinated activities conducted by state and non-state actors”. These activities include information manipulation, interference by foreign actors, information operations, and disinformation, which are used to create confusion, sow division, destabilize societies, and influence perceptions.
Divided Society
The expansion of technological tools, including social media and AI, has allowed autocratic states like Russia to exploit vulnerabilities in neighboring countries, including Georgia. Russia’s objectives include maintaining informational, economic, and military influence over former Soviet countries by exploiting Georgia’s fragile economy, social issues, political polarization, media alignment, and politicization of traditional values. Russia also capitalizes on signs of Euro-Atlantic integration fatigue and unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. The Kremlin discredits Western values and institutions, while also promoting pro-Kremlin narratives, emphasizing an alleged incompatibility between Georgian identity and Western liberal democracy. Homegrown online disinformation has also become increasingly pervasive.
Disinformation is an integral part of Russia’s hybrid war and disrupts democratic decision-making, undermines societal norms, and exacerbates political polarization. Key contributing factors are the high degree of polarization and societal division, as well as the low level of social and political trust, resulting in low media literacy. Data indicates that trust in news outlets and political parties is relatively low, especially in urban areas and among younger segments of the population.
Local Practices and Perceptions on Information Threats
Georgia’s response to information threats suffers from political contestation and polarization, despite having strategic documents in place. There are legal, institutional, and civic instruments to respond to information threats, but their effectiveness is limited due to inconsistent use and a lack of political will from the government. Strategic communications teams are often seen as engaging in partisan public relations campaigns for the ruling party.
One recent document addressing information threats is the 2024-2027 Communications Strategy of the Government of Georgia, which creates media monitoring units to identify disinformation and its channels. Other laws include the Law on Information Security (2012) and the Criminal Code of Georgia (1999). Despite these defined threats, few measures have been taken to mitigate the negative impact of information threats, and the Georgian government is seen by some experts as a source of disinformation.
Civil society monitoring has highlighted the absence of genuine political will from authorities to realize their stated objectives. For example, Facebook identified and penalized the primary governmental body responsible for coordinating strategic communication for trolling and disseminating disinformation.
Perceptions of the Georgian Media and Security Community Regarding Information Threats
The media plays a crucial role in both spreading and mitigating information threats in Georgia, influencing societal resilience. A focus group with media representatives identified common disinformation narratives such as claims that EU values conflict with Georgian values, assertions that Russia invaded Ukraine due to NATO ambitions, and allegations that opposition groups and NGOs pose threats to national security.
The journalists described measures they use to combat disinformation, but admitted that disinformation continues to affect their work. Editorial policies, political pressures, and a lack of professionalism shape information dissemination. Anti-Western narratives arising from domestic pro-government sources frame the West as an adversary of Georgian values, which are easily exploited by external anti-Western actors. External and internal influences on Georgian media are interdependent. Media representatives underlined the importance of presenting balanced information and avoiding sensationalism to enhance public resilience.
Security experts echoed similar concerns, emphasizing the impact of information threats on societal well-being and democratic engagement. They viewed information warfare as an essential tool in Russia’s strategy to weaken Georgia’s statehood and hinder its Western integration. The spread of disinformation has led to increased nihilism, public apathy, and a fear of change. The line between government and external influence is blurred, with Georgia’s ruling party acting as the primary vector of Russian influence.
Learning from Estonia: Resilience Against Russian Influence
Estonia has been proactive in resisting Russian malign influence by exploiting vulnerabilities. Estonia has built resilience through transparency, coordinated government action, and engagement with civil society. An integrated national strategy involving both public and private actors can bolster societal resilience, contrasting with Georgia, where the government and ruling party spread Russian disinformation narratives.
An example of Estonia’s resilience was the relocation of the Bronze Soldier monument in 2007, which ignited riots and led to a coordinated cyber-attack from Russia. Estonia’s transparent communication during the crisis helped mitigate the impact. In recent years, Estonia has continued to face Russian malign influence campaigns, such as the 2023 incident where two Estonian citizens were charged with treason for allegedly working with Russian agents.
A key part of Estonia’s success has been its focus on managing the information landscape through effective media policies, such as the establishment of ETV+, a Russian-language channel providing independent, credible news.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Disinformation threats in Georgia thrive due to geopolitical and domestic political factors. Geopolitically, Georgia is in a fragile regional environment, lacking security guarantees. Domestically, this fragility is exploited by political actors to advance their agendas. Recent years have seen the ruling party adopt increasingly hostile rhetoric towards Georgia’s Western partners, which pro-Kremlin outlets have echoed.
The study highlights the impact of information threats on Georgia’s political stability, societal cohesion, and psychological resilience. Responses to information threats are fragmented and lack a coherent, whole-of-society approach. The Estonian case demonstrates the potential effectiveness of a coordinated, comprehensive strategy.
The full publication from which this blogpost is distilled was co-authored by Kornely Kakachia (GIP), Bidzina Lebanidze (GIP), Marek Kohv (ICDS) , Salome Kandelaki (GIP) and Shota Kakabadze(GIP). This publication was made possible with the financial support from NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division and the British Embassy in Tbilisi. The project, “Managing the Impact of Information Manipulation on Georgia’s Psychological Resilience,” was co-sponsored by both organizations.
Photo ©️ Georgian Institute of Politics
